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Takeover Protection and Firm Value
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Review of Law & Economics |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
| In: | Review of Law & Economics, 15, 2019, 1 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Unbestimmt |
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Walter de Gruyter GmbH
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Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart |
|---|---|
| author |
Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart |
| spellingShingle |
Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart Review of Law & Economics Takeover Protection and Firm Value Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
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andres, christian |
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Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart 1555-5879 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0048 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We examine firm value consequences of anti-takeover regulation, exploiting the staggered announcement and implementation of an anti-takeover regulation in the U.K. We show that, on average, takeover protection increases firm value. This effect is partly driven by innovative firms expanding their R&D activities. However, the anti-takeover regulation also increases the value of less productive firms. Anti-takeover regulation could thus constrain highly productive firms from taking over low-productivity firms. Our results imply that, while takeover protection may stimulate innovation, it can distort the allocation of funds by preventing market share from moving from less efficient to more efficient firms.</jats:p> Takeover Protection and Firm Value Review of Law & Economics |
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Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
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Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
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Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
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Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
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Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_short |
Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
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takeover protection and firm value |
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Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0048 |
| publishDate |
2019 |
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|
| description |
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>We examine firm value consequences of anti-takeover regulation, exploiting the staggered announcement and implementation of an anti-takeover regulation in the U.K. We show that, on average, takeover protection increases firm value. This effect is partly driven by innovative firms expanding their R&D activities. However, the anti-takeover regulation also increases the value of less productive firms. Anti-takeover regulation could thus constrain highly productive firms from taking over low-productivity firms. Our results imply that, while takeover protection may stimulate innovation, it can distort the allocation of funds by preventing market share from moving from less efficient to more efficient firms.</jats:p> |
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| author | Andres, Christian, Jacob, Martin, Ulrich, Lennart |
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| description | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We examine firm value consequences of anti-takeover regulation, exploiting the staggered announcement and implementation of an anti-takeover regulation in the U.K. We show that, on average, takeover protection increases firm value. This effect is partly driven by innovative firms expanding their R&D activities. However, the anti-takeover regulation also increases the value of less productive firms. Anti-takeover regulation could thus constrain highly productive firms from taking over low-productivity firms. Our results imply that, while takeover protection may stimulate innovation, it can distort the allocation of funds by preventing market share from moving from less efficient to more efficient firms.</jats:p> |
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| spelling | Andres, Christian Jacob, Martin Ulrich, Lennart 1555-5879 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0048 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We examine firm value consequences of anti-takeover regulation, exploiting the staggered announcement and implementation of an anti-takeover regulation in the U.K. We show that, on average, takeover protection increases firm value. This effect is partly driven by innovative firms expanding their R&D activities. However, the anti-takeover regulation also increases the value of less productive firms. Anti-takeover regulation could thus constrain highly productive firms from taking over low-productivity firms. Our results imply that, while takeover protection may stimulate innovation, it can distort the allocation of funds by preventing market share from moving from less efficient to more efficient firms.</jats:p> Takeover Protection and Firm Value Review of Law & Economics |
| spellingShingle | Andres, Christian, Jacob, Martin, Ulrich, Lennart, Review of Law & Economics, Takeover Protection and Firm Value, Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| title | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_full | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_fullStr | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_full_unstemmed | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_short | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| title_sort | takeover protection and firm value |
| title_unstemmed | Takeover Protection and Firm Value |
| topic | Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0048 |