Eintrag weiter verarbeiten
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
Gespeichert in:
| Zeitschriftentitel: | Review of Law & Economics |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , |
| In: | Review of Law & Economics, 15, 2019, 2 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Unbestimmt |
| veröffentlicht: |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
|
| Schlagwörter: |
| author_facet |
Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves |
|---|---|
| author |
Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves |
| spellingShingle |
Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves Review of Law & Economics Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| author_sort |
lambert, eve-angeline |
| spelling |
Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves 1555-5879 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0029 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Departing from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judge’s and the expert’s efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judge’s and the expert’s effort levels and of the judge’s decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expert’s effort is decreasing in the judge’s effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judge’s effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case.</jats:p> Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts Review of Law & Economics |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1515/rle-2016-0029 |
| facet_avail |
Online |
| finc_class_facet |
Rechtswissenschaft |
| format |
ElectronicArticle |
| fullrecord |
blob:ai-49-aHR0cDovL2R4LmRvaS5vcmcvMTAuMTUxNS9ybGUtMjAxNi0wMDI5 |
| id |
ai-49-aHR0cDovL2R4LmRvaS5vcmcvMTAuMTUxNS9ybGUtMjAxNi0wMDI5 |
| institution |
DE-Ch1 DE-L229 DE-D275 DE-Bn3 DE-Brt1 DE-D161 DE-Gla1 DE-Zi4 DE-15 DE-Pl11 DE-Rs1 DE-105 DE-14 |
| imprint |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019 |
| imprint_str_mv |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019 |
| issn |
1555-5879 |
| issn_str_mv |
1555-5879 |
| language |
Undetermined |
| mega_collection |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH (CrossRef) |
| match_str |
lambert2019optimalresorttocourtappointedexperts |
| publishDateSort |
2019 |
| publisher |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH |
| recordtype |
ai |
| record_format |
ai |
| series |
Review of Law & Economics |
| source_id |
49 |
| title |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_unstemmed |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_full |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_fullStr |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_short |
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_sort |
optimal resort to court-appointed experts |
| topic |
Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0029 |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| physical |
|
| description |
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>Departing from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judge’s and the expert’s efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judge’s and the expert’s effort levels and of the judge’s decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expert’s effort is decreasing in the judge’s effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judge’s effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case.</jats:p> |
| container_issue |
2 |
| container_start_page |
0 |
| container_title |
Review of Law & Economics |
| container_volume |
15 |
| format_de105 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_de14 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_de15 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_de520 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_de540 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_dech1 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_ded117 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_degla1 |
E-Article |
| format_del152 |
Buch |
| format_del189 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_dezi4 |
Article |
| format_dezwi2 |
Article, E-Article |
| format_finc |
Article, E-Article |
| format_nrw |
Article, E-Article |
| _version_ |
1792321707458953233 |
| geogr_code |
not assigned |
| last_indexed |
2024-03-01T11:05:56.155Z |
| geogr_code_person |
not assigned |
| openURL |
url_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fvufind.svn.sourceforge.net%3Agenerator&rft.title=Optimal+Resort+to+Court-Appointed+Experts&rft.date=2019-07-26&genre=article&issn=1555-5879&volume=15&issue=2&jtitle=Review+of+Law+%26+Economics&atitle=Optimal+Resort+to+Court-Appointed+Experts&aulast=Oytana&aufirst=Yves&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1515%2Frle-2016-0029&rft.language%5B0%5D=und |
| SOLR | |
| _version_ | 1792321707458953233 |
| author | Lambert, Eve-Angeline, Oytana, Yves |
| author_facet | Lambert, Eve-Angeline, Oytana, Yves, Lambert, Eve-Angeline, Oytana, Yves |
| author_sort | lambert, eve-angeline |
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 0 |
| container_title | Review of Law & Economics |
| container_volume | 15 |
| description | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Departing from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judge’s and the expert’s efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judge’s and the expert’s effort levels and of the judge’s decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expert’s effort is decreasing in the judge’s effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judge’s effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case.</jats:p> |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1515/rle-2016-0029 |
| facet_avail | Online |
| finc_class_facet | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | ElectronicArticle |
| format_de105 | Article, E-Article |
| format_de14 | Article, E-Article |
| format_de15 | Article, E-Article |
| format_de520 | Article, E-Article |
| format_de540 | Article, E-Article |
| format_dech1 | Article, E-Article |
| format_ded117 | Article, E-Article |
| format_degla1 | E-Article |
| format_del152 | Buch |
| format_del189 | Article, E-Article |
| format_dezi4 | Article |
| format_dezwi2 | Article, E-Article |
| format_finc | Article, E-Article |
| format_nrw | Article, E-Article |
| geogr_code | not assigned |
| geogr_code_person | not assigned |
| id | ai-49-aHR0cDovL2R4LmRvaS5vcmcvMTAuMTUxNS9ybGUtMjAxNi0wMDI5 |
| imprint | Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019 |
| imprint_str_mv | Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019 |
| institution | DE-Ch1, DE-L229, DE-D275, DE-Bn3, DE-Brt1, DE-D161, DE-Gla1, DE-Zi4, DE-15, DE-Pl11, DE-Rs1, DE-105, DE-14 |
| issn | 1555-5879 |
| issn_str_mv | 1555-5879 |
| language | Undetermined |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-01T11:05:56.155Z |
| match_str | lambert2019optimalresorttocourtappointedexperts |
| mega_collection | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (CrossRef) |
| physical | |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH |
| record_format | ai |
| recordtype | ai |
| series | Review of Law & Economics |
| source_id | 49 |
| spelling | Lambert, Eve-Angeline Oytana, Yves 1555-5879 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0029 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Departing from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judge’s and the expert’s efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judge’s and the expert’s effort levels and of the judge’s decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expert’s effort is decreasing in the judge’s effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judge’s effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case.</jats:p> Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts Review of Law & Economics |
| spellingShingle | Lambert, Eve-Angeline, Oytana, Yves, Review of Law & Economics, Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts, Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| title | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_full | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_short | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| title_sort | optimal resort to court-appointed experts |
| title_unstemmed | Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts |
| topic | Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0029 |