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author Esser, Andrea Marlen
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Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
Philosophy
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spelling Esser, Andrea Marlen 2192-1482 0012-1045 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2017-0068 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In contemporary political discourse, in which many democratic relationships hitherto taken to be self-explanatory and stable have begun to falter somewhat, a call for judgement has, after a lengthy interval, made itself heard again. Yet even if it is in some way clear to us what is meant by political judgement, and clear, too, that it is certainly useful for political actors or institutions to have political judgement at their disposal, it is, nevertheless, difficult to specify the concept precisely. What can we, and what should we, understand by “political judgement”? This essay attempts to address the question. In a first step (1) I try to indicate something of the relevant “disposition” involved. I then (2) take a brief look at conceptions of judgement which have been tried out to date, at least within the philosophical tradition. Here I concentrate on Hannah Arendt’s famous, yet fragmentary and incomplete, contribution and her reflections on Kant’s <jats:italic>Critique of Judgment</jats:italic>, in which she develops a political reading of what Kant called the “Maxims of Judgment”. In a third step (3) I will briefly elucidate these. In my view, however, we should not be content to leave the matter with Arendt’s reflections. For this reason, I also attempt a pragmatist transformation of these maxims. In a fourth step (4) I try to indicate the consequences which this might have for the way in which theories are formulated in political philosophy.</jats:p> Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
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title Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_unstemmed Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_full Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_fullStr Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_full_unstemmed Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_short Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_sort politische urteilskraft – zur aktualität eines traditionellen begriffs
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description <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In contemporary political discourse, in which many democratic relationships hitherto taken to be self-explanatory and stable have begun to falter somewhat, a call for judgement has, after a lengthy interval, made itself heard again. Yet even if it is in some way clear to us what is meant by political judgement, and clear, too, that it is certainly useful for political actors or institutions to have political judgement at their disposal, it is, nevertheless, difficult to specify the concept precisely. What can we, and what should we, understand by “political judgement”? This essay attempts to address the question. In a first step (1) I try to indicate something of the relevant “disposition” involved. I then (2) take a brief look at conceptions of judgement which have been tried out to date, at least within the philosophical tradition. Here I concentrate on Hannah Arendt’s famous, yet fragmentary and incomplete, contribution and her reflections on Kant’s <jats:italic>Critique of Judgment</jats:italic>, in which she develops a political reading of what Kant called the “Maxims of Judgment”. In a third step (3) I will briefly elucidate these. In my view, however, we should not be content to leave the matter with Arendt’s reflections. For this reason, I also attempt a pragmatist transformation of these maxims. In a fourth step (4) I try to indicate the consequences which this might have for the way in which theories are formulated in political philosophy.</jats:p>
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description <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In contemporary political discourse, in which many democratic relationships hitherto taken to be self-explanatory and stable have begun to falter somewhat, a call for judgement has, after a lengthy interval, made itself heard again. Yet even if it is in some way clear to us what is meant by political judgement, and clear, too, that it is certainly useful for political actors or institutions to have political judgement at their disposal, it is, nevertheless, difficult to specify the concept precisely. What can we, and what should we, understand by “political judgement”? This essay attempts to address the question. In a first step (1) I try to indicate something of the relevant “disposition” involved. I then (2) take a brief look at conceptions of judgement which have been tried out to date, at least within the philosophical tradition. Here I concentrate on Hannah Arendt’s famous, yet fragmentary and incomplete, contribution and her reflections on Kant’s <jats:italic>Critique of Judgment</jats:italic>, in which she develops a political reading of what Kant called the “Maxims of Judgment”. In a third step (3) I will briefly elucidate these. In my view, however, we should not be content to leave the matter with Arendt’s reflections. For this reason, I also attempt a pragmatist transformation of these maxims. In a fourth step (4) I try to indicate the consequences which this might have for the way in which theories are formulated in political philosophy.</jats:p>
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spelling Esser, Andrea Marlen 2192-1482 0012-1045 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2017-0068 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In contemporary political discourse, in which many democratic relationships hitherto taken to be self-explanatory and stable have begun to falter somewhat, a call for judgement has, after a lengthy interval, made itself heard again. Yet even if it is in some way clear to us what is meant by political judgement, and clear, too, that it is certainly useful for political actors or institutions to have political judgement at their disposal, it is, nevertheless, difficult to specify the concept precisely. What can we, and what should we, understand by “political judgement”? This essay attempts to address the question. In a first step (1) I try to indicate something of the relevant “disposition” involved. I then (2) take a brief look at conceptions of judgement which have been tried out to date, at least within the philosophical tradition. Here I concentrate on Hannah Arendt’s famous, yet fragmentary and incomplete, contribution and her reflections on Kant’s <jats:italic>Critique of Judgment</jats:italic>, in which she develops a political reading of what Kant called the “Maxims of Judgment”. In a third step (3) I will briefly elucidate these. In my view, however, we should not be content to leave the matter with Arendt’s reflections. For this reason, I also attempt a pragmatist transformation of these maxims. In a fourth step (4) I try to indicate the consequences which this might have for the way in which theories are formulated in political philosophy.</jats:p> Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
spellingShingle Esser, Andrea Marlen, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs, Philosophy
title Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_full Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_fullStr Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_full_unstemmed Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_short Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
title_sort politische urteilskraft – zur aktualität eines traditionellen begriffs
title_unstemmed Politische Urteilskraft – Zur Aktualität eines traditionellen Begriffs
topic Philosophy
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2017-0068