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Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions
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Zeitschriftentitel: | Analyse & Kritik |
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Personen und Körperschaften: | |
In: | Analyse & Kritik, 41, 2019, 1, S. 125-146 |
Format: | E-Article |
Sprache: | Englisch |
veröffentlicht: |
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
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Schlagwörter: |
author_facet |
Hindriks, Frank Hindriks, Frank |
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author |
Hindriks, Frank |
spellingShingle |
Hindriks, Frank Analyse & Kritik Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions Philosophy Sociology and Political Science |
author_sort |
hindriks, frank |
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Hindriks, Frank 2365-9858 0171-5860 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Philosophy Sociology and Political Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-410109 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.</jats:p> Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions Analyse & Kritik |
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Walter de Gruyter GmbH |
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Analyse & Kritik |
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title |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_unstemmed |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_full |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_fullStr |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_short |
Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_sort |
norms that make a difference: social practices and institutions |
topic |
Philosophy Sociology and Political Science |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-410109 |
publishDate |
2019 |
physical |
125-146 |
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<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.</jats:p> |
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description | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.</jats:p> |
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spelling | Hindriks, Frank 2365-9858 0171-5860 Walter de Gruyter GmbH Philosophy Sociology and Political Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-410109 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.</jats:p> Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions Analyse & Kritik |
spellingShingle | Hindriks, Frank, Analyse & Kritik, Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions, Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science |
title | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_full | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_fullStr | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_full_unstemmed | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_short | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
title_sort | norms that make a difference: social practices and institutions |
title_unstemmed | Norms that Make a Difference: Social Practices and Institutions |
topic | Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2019-410109 |