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Valuations and dynamics of negotiations
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | |
| In: | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22, 2020, 1, S. 245-273 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
| Schlagwörter: |
| author_facet |
Gomes, Armando Gomes, Armando |
|---|---|
| author |
Gomes, Armando |
| spellingShingle |
Gomes, Armando Journal of Public Economic Theory Valuations and dynamics of negotiations Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Finance |
| author_sort |
gomes, armando |
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Gomes, Armando 1097-3923 1467-9779 Wiley Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12410 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.</jats:p> Valuations and dynamics of negotiations Journal of Public Economic Theory |
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Wiley, 2020 |
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Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
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Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
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Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_short |
Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_sort |
valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| topic |
Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Finance |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12410 |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| physical |
245-273 |
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<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.</jats:p> |
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| description | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.</jats:p> |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jpet.12410 |
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| imprint | Wiley, 2020 |
| imprint_str_mv | Wiley, 2020 |
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| issn | 1097-3923, 1467-9779 |
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| series | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
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| spelling | Gomes, Armando 1097-3923 1467-9779 Wiley Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12410 <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.</jats:p> Valuations and dynamics of negotiations Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| spellingShingle | Gomes, Armando, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Valuations and dynamics of negotiations, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Finance |
| title | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_full | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_fullStr | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_short | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_sort | valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| title_unstemmed | Valuations and dynamics of negotiations |
| topic | Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Finance |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12410 |