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Holyoak, Keith J.
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Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
Artificial Intelligence
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spelling Rai, Tage S. Holyoak, Keith J. 0364-0213 1551-6709 Wiley Artificial Intelligence Cognitive Neuroscience Experimental and Cognitive Psychology http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01088.x <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.</jats:p> Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem Cognitive Science
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title Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_unstemmed Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_full Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_fullStr Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_full_unstemmed Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_short Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_sort moral principles or consumer preferences? alternative framings of the trolley problem
topic Artificial Intelligence
Cognitive Neuroscience
Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01088.x
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description <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.</jats:p>
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container_issue 2
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description <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.</jats:p>
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spelling Rai, Tage S. Holyoak, Keith J. 0364-0213 1551-6709 Wiley Artificial Intelligence Cognitive Neuroscience Experimental and Cognitive Psychology http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01088.x <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.</jats:p> Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem Cognitive Science
spellingShingle Rai, Tage S., Holyoak, Keith J., Cognitive Science, Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
title Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_full Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_fullStr Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_full_unstemmed Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_short Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
title_sort moral principles or consumer preferences? alternative framings of the trolley problem
title_unstemmed Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem
topic Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01088.x