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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | International Economic Review |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
| In: | International Economic Review, 48, 2007, 3, S. 901-927 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Wiley
|
| Schlagwörter: |
| author_facet |
Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. |
|---|---|
| author |
Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. |
| spellingShingle |
Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. International Economic Review USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* Economics and Econometrics |
| author_sort |
lange, andreas |
| spelling |
Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. 0020-6598 1468-2354 Wiley Economics and Econometrics http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00449.x <jats:p>This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.</jats:p> USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* International Economic Review |
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| title |
USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
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using lotteries to finance public goods: theory and experimental evidence* |
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Economics and Econometrics |
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2007 |
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901-927 |
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<jats:p>This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.</jats:p> |
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| description | <jats:p>This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.</jats:p> |
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| spelling | Lange, Andreas List, John A. Price, Michael K. 0020-6598 1468-2354 Wiley Economics and Econometrics http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00449.x <jats:p>This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.</jats:p> USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* International Economic Review |
| spellingShingle | Lange, Andreas, List, John A., Price, Michael K., International Economic Review, USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*, Economics and Econometrics |
| title | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| title_full | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| title_fullStr | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| title_full_unstemmed | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| title_short | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| title_sort | using lotteries to finance public goods: theory and experimental evidence* |
| title_unstemmed | USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE* |
| topic | Economics and Econometrics |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00449.x |