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An agency theory approach towards bribery
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | |
| In: | Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 27, 2019, 2, S. 160-168 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Emerald
|
| Schlagwörter: |
| author_facet |
Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian |
|---|---|
| author |
Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian |
| spellingShingle |
Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance An agency theory approach towards bribery Strategy and Management |
| author_sort |
johannes teichmann, fabian maximilian |
| spelling |
Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian 1358-1988 Emerald Strategy and Management http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0041 <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> An agency theory approach towards bribery Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance |
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Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance |
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49 |
| title |
An agency theory approach towards bribery |
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An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_full |
An agency theory approach towards bribery |
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An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_full_unstemmed |
An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_short |
An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_sort |
an agency theory approach towards bribery |
| topic |
Strategy and Management |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0041 |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| physical |
160-168 |
| description |
<jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> |
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| author | Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian |
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| description | <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> |
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| spelling | Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian 1358-1988 Emerald Strategy and Management http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0041 <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> An agency theory approach towards bribery Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance |
| spellingShingle | Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, An agency theory approach towards bribery, Strategy and Management |
| title | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_full | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_fullStr | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_full_unstemmed | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_short | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_sort | an agency theory approach towards bribery |
| title_unstemmed | An agency theory approach towards bribery |
| topic | Strategy and Management |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-03-2018-0041 |