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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | International Organization |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | |
| In: | International Organization, 52, 1998, 2, S. 231-268 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
|
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Broz, J. Lawrence Broz, J. Lawrence |
|---|---|
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Broz, J. Lawrence |
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Broz, J. Lawrence International Organization The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem Law Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science |
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broz, j. lawrence |
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Broz, J. Lawrence 0020-8183 1531-5088 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Law Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162811 <jats:p>This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.</jats:p> The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem International Organization |
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| title |
The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
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the origins of central banking: solutions to the free-rider problem |
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Law Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science |
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1998 |
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<jats:p>This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.</jats:p> |
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| description | <jats:p>This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.</jats:p> |
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| spelling | Broz, J. Lawrence 0020-8183 1531-5088 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Law Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162811 <jats:p>This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.</jats:p> The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem International Organization |
| spellingShingle | Broz, J. Lawrence, International Organization, The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem, Law, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science |
| title | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| title_full | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| title_fullStr | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| title_short | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| title_sort | the origins of central banking: solutions to the free-rider problem |
| title_unstemmed | The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem |
| topic | Law, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162811 |