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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , , |
| In: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55, 2020, 3, S. 869-896 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
|
| Schlagwörter: |
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Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan |
|---|---|
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Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan |
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Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting |
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Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan 0022-1090 1756-6916 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000243 <jats:p>We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.</jats:p> Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
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analyst promotions within credit rating agencies: accuracy or bias? |
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Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000243 |
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2020 |
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869-896 |
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<jats:p>We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.</jats:p> |
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| author | Kisgen, Darren J., Nickerson, Jordan, Osborn, Matthew, Reuter, Jonathan |
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| description | <jats:p>We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.</jats:p> |
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| spelling | Kisgen, Darren J. Nickerson, Jordan Osborn, Matthew Reuter, Jonathan 0022-1090 1756-6916 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000243 <jats:p>We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.</jats:p> Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
| spellingShingle | Kisgen, Darren J., Nickerson, Jordan, Osborn, Matthew, Reuter, Jonathan, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?, Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Accounting |
| title | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| title_full | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| title_fullStr | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| title_short | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| title_sort | analyst promotions within credit rating agencies: accuracy or bias? |
| title_unstemmed | Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias? |
| topic | Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Accounting |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000243 |