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Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
| In: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55, 2020, 3, S. 931-954 |
| Format: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
|
| Schlagwörter: |
| author_facet |
Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch |
|---|---|
| author |
Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch |
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Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting |
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Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch 0022-1090 1756-6916 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000085 <jats:p>We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.</jats:p> Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
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Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
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Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
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Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_fullStr |
Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_short |
Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_sort |
market evidence on investor preference for fewer directorships |
| topic |
Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000085 |
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2020 |
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931-954 |
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<jats:p>We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.</jats:p> |
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| author | Bar-Hava, Keren, Gu, Feng, Lev, Baruch |
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| description | <jats:p>We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.</jats:p> |
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| imprint_str_mv | Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2020 |
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| spelling | Bar-Hava, Keren Gu, Feng Lev, Baruch 0022-1090 1756-6916 Cambridge University Press (CUP) Economics and Econometrics Finance Accounting http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000085 <jats:p>We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.</jats:p> Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
| spellingShingle | Bar-Hava, Keren, Gu, Feng, Lev, Baruch, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships, Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Accounting |
| title | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_full | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_fullStr | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_full_unstemmed | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_short | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| title_sort | market evidence on investor preference for fewer directorships |
| title_unstemmed | Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships |
| topic | Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Accounting |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000085 |