Eintrag weiter verarbeiten
Algorithmic Game Theory: Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings
Gespeichert in:
| Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
|---|---|
| Titel: | Algorithmic Game Theory: Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings/ edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. Spirakis |
| Format: | E-Book Konferenzbericht |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2010
|
| Gesamtaufnahme: |
SpringerLink Lecture notes in computer science ; 6386 |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Buchausg. u.d.T.: | Algorithmic game theory, Berlin : Springer, 2010, XIII, 358 S. |
| Quelle: | Verbunddaten SWB |
| Zugangsinformationen: | Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
| Zusammenfassung: | When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. |
|---|---|
| Umfang: | Online-Ressource (VIII, 359p, digital) |
| ISBN: |
9783642161704
|
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4 |