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Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments
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Zeitschriftentitel: | American Economic Review |
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Personen und Körperschaften: | , , |
In: | American Economic Review, 103, 2013, 1, S. 415-437 |
Format: | E-Article |
Sprache: | Englisch |
veröffentlicht: |
American Economic Association
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Schlagwörter: |
author_facet |
Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y |
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author |
Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y |
spellingShingle |
Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y American Economic Review Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments Economics and Econometrics |
author_sort |
brock, j. michelle |
spelling |
Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y 0002-8282 American Economic Association Economics and Econometrics http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.415 <jats:p> We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81) </jats:p> Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments American Economic Review |
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American Economic Association |
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American Economic Review |
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title |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_unstemmed |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_full |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_fullStr |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_full_unstemmed |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_short |
Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_sort |
dictating the risk: experimental evidence on giving in risky environments |
topic |
Economics and Econometrics |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.415 |
publishDate |
2013 |
physical |
415-437 |
description |
<jats:p> We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81) </jats:p> |
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author | Brock, J. Michelle, Lange, Andreas, Ozbay, Erkut Y |
author_facet | Brock, J. Michelle, Lange, Andreas, Ozbay, Erkut Y, Brock, J. Michelle, Lange, Andreas, Ozbay, Erkut Y |
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description | <jats:p> We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81) </jats:p> |
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spelling | Brock, J. Michelle Lange, Andreas Ozbay, Erkut Y 0002-8282 American Economic Association Economics and Econometrics http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.415 <jats:p> We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81) </jats:p> Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments American Economic Review |
spellingShingle | Brock, J. Michelle, Lange, Andreas, Ozbay, Erkut Y, American Economic Review, Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments, Economics and Econometrics |
title | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_full | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_fullStr | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_full_unstemmed | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_short | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
title_sort | dictating the risk: experimental evidence on giving in risky environments |
title_unstemmed | Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments |
topic | Economics and Econometrics |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.415 |