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Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing
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Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Financial Crime |
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Personen und Körperschaften: | |
In: | Journal of Financial Crime, 26, 2019, 2, S. 519-525 |
Format: | E-Article |
Sprache: | Englisch |
veröffentlicht: |
Emerald
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Schlagwörter: |
author_facet |
Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes |
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author |
Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes |
spellingShingle |
Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes Journal of Financial Crime Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
author_sort |
teichmann, fabian maximilian johannes |
spelling |
Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes 1359-0790 Emerald Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2018-0041 <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>While existing literature focusses on the causes and negative consequences of corruption, this paper illustrates the potential use of whistleblowing incentives to combat bribery in multinational corporations. The purpose of the present study is to highlight that anti-bribery mechanisms, which have already been successfully applied in the public sector, may also be deployed in multinational organisations.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>A two-step qualitative research process was used. Informal interviews were conducted with 35 corrupt public officials, followed by formal interviews with 35 compliance experts and law enforcement officers. During the interviews, the advantages and disadvantages of whistleblowing incentives in multinational corporations were discussed. The interviewees’ responses were subjected to content analysis.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>The principal finding was that rewarding employees with significant monetary bonuses may help to increase anti-bribery whistleblowing. However, such bonus payments should be made in only major cases of bribery to safeguard multinational corporations, company cultures and trust among employees.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>The findings convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees based in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The paper offers suggestions to multinational corporations on how to effectively combat corruption and other forms of white-collar crime.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based on a European sample, the results may be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing Journal of Financial Crime |
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10.1108/jfc-04-2018-0041 |
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Journal of Financial Crime |
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title |
Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
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Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_full |
Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_fullStr |
Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
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Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_short |
Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_sort |
incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
topic |
Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2018-0041 |
publishDate |
2019 |
physical |
519-525 |
description |
<jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>While existing literature focusses on the causes and negative consequences of corruption, this paper illustrates the potential use of whistleblowing incentives to combat bribery in multinational corporations. The purpose of the present study is to highlight that anti-bribery mechanisms, which have already been successfully applied in the public sector, may also be deployed in multinational organisations.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>A two-step qualitative research process was used. Informal interviews were conducted with 35 corrupt public officials, followed by formal interviews with 35 compliance experts and law enforcement officers. During the interviews, the advantages and disadvantages of whistleblowing incentives in multinational corporations were discussed. The interviewees’ responses were subjected to content analysis.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>The principal finding was that rewarding employees with significant monetary bonuses may help to increase anti-bribery whistleblowing. However, such bonus payments should be made in only major cases of bribery to safeguard multinational corporations, company cultures and trust among employees.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>The findings convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees based in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The paper offers suggestions to multinational corporations on how to effectively combat corruption and other forms of white-collar crime.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based on a European sample, the results may be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> |
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author | Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes |
author_facet | Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes, Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes |
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container_title | Journal of Financial Crime |
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description | <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>While existing literature focusses on the causes and negative consequences of corruption, this paper illustrates the potential use of whistleblowing incentives to combat bribery in multinational corporations. The purpose of the present study is to highlight that anti-bribery mechanisms, which have already been successfully applied in the public sector, may also be deployed in multinational organisations.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>A two-step qualitative research process was used. Informal interviews were conducted with 35 corrupt public officials, followed by formal interviews with 35 compliance experts and law enforcement officers. During the interviews, the advantages and disadvantages of whistleblowing incentives in multinational corporations were discussed. The interviewees’ responses were subjected to content analysis.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>The principal finding was that rewarding employees with significant monetary bonuses may help to increase anti-bribery whistleblowing. However, such bonus payments should be made in only major cases of bribery to safeguard multinational corporations, company cultures and trust among employees.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>The findings convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees based in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The paper offers suggestions to multinational corporations on how to effectively combat corruption and other forms of white-collar crime.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based on a European sample, the results may be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> |
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spelling | Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes 1359-0790 Emerald Law General Economics, Econometrics and Finance http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2018-0041 <jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Purpose</jats:title><jats:p>While existing literature focusses on the causes and negative consequences of corruption, this paper illustrates the potential use of whistleblowing incentives to combat bribery in multinational corporations. The purpose of the present study is to highlight that anti-bribery mechanisms, which have already been successfully applied in the public sector, may also be deployed in multinational organisations.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Design/methodology/approach</jats:title><jats:p>A two-step qualitative research process was used. Informal interviews were conducted with 35 corrupt public officials, followed by formal interviews with 35 compliance experts and law enforcement officers. During the interviews, the advantages and disadvantages of whistleblowing incentives in multinational corporations were discussed. The interviewees’ responses were subjected to content analysis.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Findings</jats:title><jats:p>The principal finding was that rewarding employees with significant monetary bonuses may help to increase anti-bribery whistleblowing. However, such bonus payments should be made in only major cases of bribery to safeguard multinational corporations, company cultures and trust among employees.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Research limitations/implications</jats:title><jats:p>The findings convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees based in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Practical implications</jats:title><jats:p>The paper offers suggestions to multinational corporations on how to effectively combat corruption and other forms of white-collar crime.</jats:p></jats:sec><jats:sec><jats:title content-type="abstract-subheading">Originality/value</jats:title><jats:p>While the empirical findings are based on a European sample, the results may be applied globally.</jats:p></jats:sec> Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing Journal of Financial Crime |
spellingShingle | Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes, Journal of Financial Crime, Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing, Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
title | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_full | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_fullStr | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_full_unstemmed | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_short | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_sort | incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
title_unstemmed | Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing |
topic | Law, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2018-0041 |